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In Defense of Intellectual Property Anxiety: A Response to Professor 
Fagundes  
 
 
 
Aaron Perzanowski 
 
Abstract:  In this Response to Professor Fagundes’s "Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain," 
Professor Perzanowski expresses skepticism about two assumptions underlying the argument for 
embracing property rhetoric to promote the public domain. This argument assumes, first, public 
recognition of social discourse theory as an account of property and, second, rhetorical 
advantages of social discourse theory that are comparable to those of more familiar notions of 
private property. Perzanowski concludes that the simple intuitive appeal of Blackstonian property 
cautions against styling the struggle for balanced copyright and patent policy as a debate over 
competing property interests. 
  
 
85 
Response 
In Defense of Intellectual Property 
Anxiety: A Response to Professor 
Fagundes 
Aaron K. Perzanowski† 
In Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, David Fa-
gundes offers a powerfully descriptive account of the role the 
rhetoric of property has played—and failed to play—in shaping 
copyright and patent policy.1 As he explains, rights holders have 
embraced property talk, harnessing its moral and rhetorical 
force to great effect. In recent decades, Congress and the courts 
have set copyright and patent protection on a trajectory of in-
creasing breadth and length, often justifying those expansions 
in the language of property rights.2 
Commentators critical of this trend have attempted to un-
dermine the force of property rhetoric by challenging the notion 
that traditional conceptions of property map onto exclusive 
rights in intangibles. Fagundes refers to this resistance to the 
equation of intellectual property exclusivity and traditional 
property rights as property anxiety.3 This anxiety, he argues, 
has led to missed opportunities to divert copyright and patent 
policy from the errant path of expansionism. Prescriptively, Fa-
gundes suggests that, rather than distance copyright and patent 
law from property, advocates of the public domain and user 
rights should appropriate property talk as a means to tap into 
its rhetorical power and counter expansionist arguments.4 
 
†  Assistant Professor, Wayne State University Law School. My thanks 
to David Fagundes for his comments. Copyright © 2010 by Aaron K. Perza-
nowski. 
 1. David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. 
L. REV. 652 (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
961 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[D]eliberate unlawful copying is no less an un-
lawful taking of property than garden-variety theft.”). 
 3. Fagundes, supra note 1, at 667–72. 
 4. Id. at 705. 
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But this rhetorical jujitsu requires us to reevaluate our 
understanding of property. According to Fagundes, advocates of 
expansive intellectual property rights and those suffering from 
property anxiety share a preoccupation with an absolutist 
Blackstonian notion of property, one that focuses on the unas-
sailable dominion exercised by the property owner.5 Intellectual 
property expansionists adopt this romantic caricature of prop-
erty, and the anxious accept it as their target.  
Fagundes points to another property tradition, the social 
discourse of property, and argues that it more accurately de-
scribes the dynamics of intellectual property and lends a rhe-
torical upper hand to friends of the public domain. The social 
discourse of property recognizes a complex system of social re-
lations that accounts for diverse and overlapping interests. Ra-
ther than focusing exclusively on private property, the social 
discourse perspective values commons and public property 
models as well. By framing arguments against expansion in 
terms of protecting public property, Fagundes envisions a 
proactive rhetorical strategy that articulates a positive account 
of the value of limiting IP rights, instead of merely chipping 
away at the foundations of the expansionist arguments. 
I am deeply sympathetic to Fagundes’s project and largely 
concur in his descriptive account. I agree that the simple intui-
tive rhetoric of Blackstonian property is a powerful tool that 
those of us who favor greater balance in the intellectual proper-
ty system have yet to match. Likewise, I am persuaded that the 
social discourse account is a better descriptive fit for copyright 
and patent exclusivity than property absolutism. Perhaps most 
importantly, I recognize the normative pull generated by charac-
terizing the public domain as a set of affirmative rights held by 
the public rather than a mere absence of rights.6 This framing 
encourages a sense of ownership and responsibility for our 
shared cultural and scientific repository and confronts efforts to 
denigrate the public domain as a lightless chasm into which 
condemned works are cast.7 
 
 5. Id. at 675. 
 6. These are just two of many ways in which we can define the public 
domain. See Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 
DUKE L.J. 783 (2006) (discussing thirteen distinct definitions of the public do-
main). 
 7. The common phrase “falling into the public domain” suggests some-
thing regrettable. Characteristically, Jack Valenti put it in even starker 
terms: “A public domain work is an orphan. No one is responsible for its life. 
But everyone exploits its use, until that time certain when it becomes soiled 
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Despite these points of fundamental agreement, I count 
myself among the anxious. This anxiety reflects skepticism 
about two assumptions underlying the argument in favor of 
embracing social discourse property rhetoric. First, the argu-
ment assumes the relevant audiences will recognize social dis-
course as an account of property. Second, it assumes the social 
discourse account will yield the many rhetorical advantages of 
private property talk. Both of those assumptions deserve closer 
examination. Ultimately, I maintain that social discourse lacks 
the intuitive appeal of the oversimplified understanding of pri-
vate property that accounts for the force property rhetoric. 
I.  SOCIAL DISCOURSE AND POPULAR NOTIONS OF 
PROPERTY   
The argument for a shift to property rhetoric depends first 
on the recognition of social discourse as a legitimate description 
of what we talk about when we talk about property. To prove 
effective, social discourse rhetoric must appeal to a number of 
audiences. And the receptiveness of each of those audiences to 
the social discourse account of property is likely to vary sub-
stantially.  
Ultimately, Fagundes aims to recast our understanding of 
property. But the public is not the only relevant audience in 
that effort. Scholars and courts play an important, if indirect, 
role in shaping our attitudes about property.  
The task of convincing academics that social discourse is 
an account of property is a manageable one. The social dis-
course approach, even if not the dominant paradigm, boasts a 
long history and established theoretical justifications.8 
But as the comparison of Kelo9 and Eldred10 and their re-
spective public reactions suggest, scholars are not the most im-
portant audience.11 Courts are one of the primary targets of the 
rhetorical power of property. Even at the highest levels of the 
judiciary, the allure of Blackstonian oversimplification remains 
 
and haggard, barren of its previous virtues.” Copyright Term, Film Labeling, 
and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 
1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 55 (1995) (statement of Jack Valenti, President 
and CEO, Motion Picture Association of America). 
 8. See Fagundes, supra note 1, at 677–83. 
 9. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 10. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 11. See Fagundes, supra note 1, at 653–57. 
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strong.12 Nonetheless, courts are a promising audience for so-
cial discourse rhetoric. Like legal academics, judges have a rel-
atively high tolerance for nuance and possess the sophistication 
necessary to internalize the notion of property as a complex of 
social relations. 
As Eldred makes all too clear, however, the ultimate arbi-
ter of the fate of the public domain is Congress, a body far less 
concerned with the intricacies of the choice between property 
romanticism and social discourse.13 Equally importantly, Con-
gress faces strong incentives, in the form of well-funded and 
well-organized lobbies, to remain persuaded by the private 
property rhetoric of rights holders.14  
Presumably, even congressional inertia will respond to suf-
ficient numbers of vocal voters. The shift to a rhetoric of social 
discourse is most likely to succeed, therefore, if it can convince 
a substantial portion of the public that “property” encompasses 
not only familiar notions of private ownership but also an in-
terrelated web of social relationships. At some level, social dis-
course is consistent with common understandings of property. 
We generally accept some restrictions on the use of private 
property for the benefit of the larger community.15 The open 
question, however, is whether a model broad enough to contain 
the public domain and user rights in copyrighted and patented 
works is one the average citizen would recognize as property. 
Putting aside the question of whether we can expect the public 
to internalize the many nuances of social discourse theory, I 
remain unconvinced that the public will recognize the claims 
that flow from social discourse as claims about property inter-
ests. We should give careful consideration to the magnitude of 
the gap between the prevailing public understanding of proper-
ty and social discourse before we attempt to bridge it. 
II.  THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF SOCIAL DISCOURSE   
This brings us to the second assumption implicit in the 
case for social discourse: rhetoric. Presuming courts, Congress, 
 
 12. Id. at 661–62 (noting Justice Scalia’s invocation of property romantic-
ism during oral argument in eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)). 
 13. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204 (noting the Court’s substantial deference to 
Congress’s determination of the appropriate duration of copyright protection). 
 14. Indeed, in the copyright context, rights holders and their representa-
tives have traditionally served as the primary drafters of copyright legislation. 
See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22–25 (2001). 
 15. Nuisance laws offer perhaps the most familiar example. See Fa-
gundes, supra note 1, at 682. 
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and the public acknowledge social discourse as property, the 
argument in favor of property talk assumes that the social dis-
course model brings to bear the same rhetorical force as proper-
ty absolutism. If the public outcry over Kelo and the success of 
IP expansionism are a function of the rhetorical power of prop-
erty generally, then this is a safe assumption. But a number of 
considerations suggest that the power of property rhetoric is 
deeply intertwined with a romantic vision of private property. 
If this is the case, then the rhetorical power of property talk 
may not transfer to rhetoric cast in social discourse. 
As Fagundes notes, the rhetoric of private property is sim-
ple.16 Stealing the property of another is wrong. This pithy 
maxim provides property absolutism with an intuitive and im-
mediately comprehensible rationale. By comparison, the social 
discourse model of property cannot make the same claim to 
simplicity. Treating works as public property after their copy-
rights expire has some intuitive resonance. But the notion that 
under some circumstances fair use or the idea/expression dis-
tinction renders aspects of protected works public property 
lacks the intuitive moral force of private ownership. Part of 
what is so powerful about property rhetoric is its ability to con-
struct a simple caricature of the complexities of the property re-
lationship. Social discourse sacrifices that simplicity for accura-
cy, diluting its rhetorical force as a result. 
The interests advocated through social discourse rhetoric 
are also diffuse. The rhetorical punch of private property talk 
derives, in part, from the concentrated interests at stake. The 
deprivation of property in Kelo was felt acutely by a handful of 
property owners. Likewise, when copyright or patent protection 
expires, the rights holder can point to concentrated economic 
losses. Harms to the public domain, on the other hand, are dis-
tributed broadly across society. This fact does not lessen the 
magnitude of these harms, but it does give us reason to suspect 
the public consciousness will be less aroused by a shrinking 
public domain.  
The public outcry over the closure of public parks offers a 
helpful counterpoint.17 If citizens are willing to take to the 
streets, or at least e-mail their representatives, over the loss of 
public parks, why not the public domain? This question points 
to another distinction between the rhetorics of private property 
 
 16. Id. at 691. 
 17. Id. at 699. 
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and social discourse: the interests advocated by private proper-
ty talk are typically concrete. In the minds of the public, the 
loss of tangible property entails palpable consequences. Given 
the centrality of land to notions of freedom and security, we are 
particularly sensitive to harms arising from losses of real prop-
erty. 
But Fagundes argues that intangible rights can create 
equally strong attachments, noting that authors and inventors 
express deep connections to their creations.18 In this sense, 
creators are as deeply invested in their works as the family 
farmer is in his land. But society’s interest in the public domain 
is far more abstract. To be clear, the public domain offers im-
mense value. It provides raw material necessary for future 
creativity and innovation,19 it lowers prices for copies of exist-
ing works, and it increases their availability.20 For the average 
citizen, however, these benefits are simply not as immediate as 
more familiar interests in tangible property. 
Fagundes responds to worries about the abstract and dif-
fuse nature of our interest in the public domain by pointing to 
the controversy surrounding the efforts of the American Society 
of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) to prevent un-
licensed Girl Scout sing-a-longs of popular music.21 This exam-
ple is instructive because it suggests that interests in the public 
domain can motivate strong public sentiment. As an initial 
matter, however, I am not convinced that the public reaction to 
ASCAP is best understood in terms of defending public proper-
ty. Although the Girls Scouts mistakenly believed the songs 
were in the public domain, the public did not necessarily share 
that belief. The widespread hostility to ASCAP is just as easily 
explained as a condemnation of its decision to assert admittedly 
valid rights against a nonprofit youth organization. 
Even accepting the defense of the public domain as the mo-
tivation for popular opposition to ASCAP, the Girl Scouts ex-
ample appears to be the exception that proves the rule. The in-
terests at stake were both concentrated and concrete. The Girl 
Scouts wanted to sing Puff the Magic Dragon around the camp-
 
 18. Id. at 696–97. 
 19. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990) 
(describing the role the public domain plays in enabling future creativity). 
 20. Dennis S. Karjala, Does Information Beget Information?, 2007 DUKE 
L. & TECH. REV. 1, 19 (2007) (“The public domain has real economic value to 
the public in that works no longer subject to copyright are generally more 
broadly available and for a lower price.”). 
 21. See Fagundes, supra note 1, at 697–98. 
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fire, and ASCAP demanded they pay for the privilege. As a re-
sult, a concrete and concentrated harm was inflicted. If proper-
ty rhetoric was at work, it succeeded because these facts 
avoided the pitfalls of abstraction and diffusion that generally 
work against the rhetoric of social discourse.22  
One final feature of property romanticism that gives it a 
rhetorical advantage over a social discourse account of the pub-
lic domain is the popular conception that property entails en-
during ownership. Property remains in the possession of its 
owner until that owner willingly parts with it, even in the face 
of competing public concerns. Kelo sparked such vocal public 
reactions largely because it offended this basic precept of the 
common understanding of property. Copyright holders, much 
like the plaintiffs in Kelo, are sympathetic when viewed 
through the potentially distorting lens of property rhetoric. The 
public domain demands that they surrender exclusive control 
over their property in the name of some broader social purpose, 
the value of which may be poorly understood by rights holders 
and the public generally. If Kelo’s aftermath teaches us any-
thing, it is that this sort of unwilling transfer offends common 
sensibilities about property. Overcoming those sensibilities is 
no small task for social discourse rhetoric. 
  CONCLUSION   
In the end, my anxiety grows out of my belief that a debate 
framed in terms of property rhetoric inevitably tilts the balance 
in favor of expansionism. Social discourse offers the virtues of 
accuracy and nuance. But as a rhetorical tool aimed at society 
generally, the simple intuitive force of property romanticism 
yields an undeniable, almost gravitational pull. The shift to 
property rhetoric forces a choice between the concentrated 
property interests of the author or inventor—themselves the 
subject of romantic notions of genius23—and the diffuse and ab-
stract interests of society in the public domain. Ultimately, I 
lack confidence that given such a choice, the relevant audiences 
will choose wisely. 
 
 22. In this sense, the Girl Scouts example could provide a model for effec-
tive social discourse rhetoric. It must identify a discrete harm felt by a particu-
lar group, ideally a sympathetic one. The question is whether that model can 
be applied generally to the interests implicated by the public domain. 
 23. See James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the 
Framers, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 625, 632–43 (1988); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory 
of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455–63 
(1991). 
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But Fagundes is quite right that those of us who favor 
more limited IP regimes need a simple and powerful positive 
account that presents the preservation and expansion of the 
public domain as a natural consequence of deeply held com-
mitments. Property anxiety is not such an account. It counters 
property talk but is not itself a rhetorical alternative. Advo-
cates of a robust public domain, however, can draw on other 
rhetorical frames. 
The rhetoric of contract, while admittedly not new and ar-
guably not successful, is one such alternative.24 The notion that 
copyright and patent grants represent a quid pro quo, whereby 
creators are granted temporary exclusivity in exchange for dis-
closing or publishing25 works that contribute to the public do-
main, is both descriptively accurate and rhetorically forceful.26 
Just as we all intuitively acknowledge the sanctity of property, 
we recognize the moral imperative of a promise. Contract rhe-
toric strikes at the same notion of fairness that gives property 
absolutism its persuasive force. But rather than balancing pub-
lic property interests against private ones, contract rhetoric es-
capes the pull of private property romanticism by supplanting 
property rhetoric altogether. 
Perhaps the only accurate measure of rhetorical merit 
emerges through practice. If so, time may well prove my anxie-
ty unjustified. Regardless of the ultimate prospects of property 
talk, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain highlights the 
 
 24. In Eldred, the Court accepted the basic proposition that the copyright 
represented a quid pro quo. The Court, however, concluded that the “this” re-
ceived by the copyright holder included both the current term of protection as 
well as any subsequent extensions. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214–15 
(2003). 
 25. L. Ray Patterson, Copyright Overextended: A Preliminary Inquiry Into 
the Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair Competition, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
385, 392 (1992) (noting that after the Copyright Act of 1976, federal copyright 
law no longer required publication as part of the quid pro quo of copyright pro-
tection). 
 26. See, e.g., James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmen-
talism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 106 (1997) (describing fair use as part of 
the implicit quid pro quo of copyright); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the 
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1017, 1022 (1989) (noting judicial characterizations of the enabling disclosure 
of a patent as the quid pro quo of patent exclusivity); Pamela Samuelson, 
CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Pro-
grams in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 705–06 (1984) (de-
scribing the contribution of “new ideas into the public domain [as] the quid pro 
quo the public received in exchange for the limited monopoly right the au-
thor received”). 
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pressing need for advocates of more moderate IP policy to focus 
on crafting arguments that appeal not only to courts, but to the 
public as well. 
 
